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ABSTRACT 
Innovation is at the heart of the Europe 2020 Strategy, in order to promote higher levels of employment and 
productivity. Special attention is given to increasing the effectiveness of innovation policy instruments, mainly 
as some authors found evidence that productivity could be negatively affected by subsidies. 
The aim of the study is to assess how the expected impact on firm productivity and employment is taken into 
account, when firms apply for public funding for innovation. The analysis is based on the case study of the 
Portuguese Innovation Incentive System in the Alentejo region. In order to understand which factors influence 
the public decision to financially support private investment, we estimated a logit model based on firms’ and 
applications’ characteristics, controlling for the macroeconomic environment. The results indicate that 
government preferences for promoting exports, exploiting firms R&D results and stimulating the level of 
qualified employment are shown to be more relevant than the impact on firm productivity. Furthermore, the 
cost to the government of new jobs created, measured at least by exemption of interest and financial charges 
on the loan, is almost twice as much for non-SMEs as for SMEs. 
 
Keywords: Public funding, Innovation, Productivity, Employment 
JEL classification: L53, O31, O38, D24. 
                                                          
1 This work was supported by the Portuguese national funding agency for science, research and technology (FCT), under the 
Project UID/SOC/04521/2013. 
2 The present article is an extended and significantly improved version of the papers presented to the 24th APDR Workshop 
“Entrepreneurship and Performance in a Regional Context” held in Lisbon, on March 17 2016 (Santos, Cincera, Neto and 
Serrano, 2016a) and the RSA Workshop “Learning from Implementation and Evaluation of the EU Cohesion Policy” held in 
Brussels, on June 13 2016 (Santos, Cincera, Neto and Serrano, 2016b). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Increasing employment, productivity and social 
cohesion are the main targets of the Europe 
2020 Strategy, and innovation plays an 
important role in this. Two ways to increase firm 
competitiveness or productivity is through a 
more qualified workforce or through innovative 
investment (e.g. introducing new technologies or 
developing new working processes). 
Under the Community Support Frameworks 
2007 – 2013, Portugal received around €21.5 
billion from the European Commission in order 
to promote jobs, innovation, competitiveness 
and productivity (Observatório do QCA III, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the country’s performance is still 
far below the EU average. For the period 2014 - 
2020, Portugal will receive around €25 billion, to 
stimulate growth and create jobs. 
One justification of public support for Research 
& Development & Innovation (RDI) is due to the 
presence of market failings. Public intervention 
aims to fill the financial gap, in order to improve 
knowledge production and come as close as 
possible to the socially optimal level. To achieve 
this goal, governments give special attention to 
increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of 
innovation policy instruments. 
The paper focuses on understanding how the 
expected impact on firm productivity and 
employment is taken into account, when firms 
apply for public funding for innovation. More 
precisely, the study intends to answer the 
following research questions: i) Is improved 
productivity and the creation of new jobs 
contemplated in all the applications submitted 
and selected? ii) How have these objectives been 
taken into account in the selection process? iii) 
How much has each new job created cost? 
The analysis is based on the case study of 
Portuguese Innovation Incentive System (SI 
Innovation) and on the applications submitted 
between 2007 and 2013 by firms intending to 
implement an investment project in Alentejo. 
The dataset was built with cross-information 
from Information System of the National 
Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) Incentive 
Scheme and statistical data from official entities 
(e.g. Statistics Portugal and Bank of Portugal). 
The methodological approach combines several 
techniques such as descriptive statistics, mean 
differences, binary logit model and cost-
effectiveness indicators. Explanatory variables 
are connected to firms’ characteristics (namely, 
size, activity sector, financial performance and 
risk level), applications’ characteristics and 
expected impact on applicant firms, and 
macroeconomic factors (such as, interest rate in 
the Portuguese capital market, regional GDP 
variation and regional concentration of skilled 
workers). 
The paper is structured as follows. After this 
introduction, Section 1 explains how the EU 
2020 Strategy is implemented in the Portuguese 
Alentejo Region and discusses the background 
theory about the determinants of receiving 
public support, considering productivity, 
innovation and employment. Section 2 presents 
data collection and the methodological approach 
implemented. Section 3 presents the results and 
their discussion, and Section 4 presents the main 
conclusions and some policy recommendations. 
 
1. BACKGROUND THEORY 
1.1. From the Europe 2020 strategy to Regional and 
Innovation Policy in Portuguese Alentejo Region 
The main priorities of the Europe 2020 strategy 
are smart, sustainable and inclusive growth for 
the European Union. With these three targets, 
the European Commission intends to develop an 
economy based on knowledge and innovation – 
smart – promoting a more resource-efficient, 
greener and more competitive economy – 
sustainable – and fostering a high-employment 
economy delivering social and territorial 
cohesion – inclusive (European Commission, 
2010:4). 
To achieve these targets, in March 2010 the 
European Commission created for the period 
2014-2020, seven flagship Initiatives: i) Digital 
Agenda for Europe; ii) Innovation Union; iii) 
Youth on the move; iv) Resource-efficient 
Europe; v) An industrial policy for the 
globalization era; vi) An Agenda for new skills 
and jobs; vii) European platform against poverty.  
In March 2012, the EU Commission presented 
the Common Strategic Framework (CSF) in order 
to help Member States and their regions in 
programming and setting clear investment 
priorities for the next financial planning period 
from 2014 until 2020. The main purpose of 
the CSF is to provide clearer strategic direction 
to the programming process at the level of 
Member States and regions, and is therefore 
expected to contribute proportionally to the 
European objectives established by the Europe 
2020 Initiative. A central issue of this framework 
is also to "increase coherence between policy 
commitments made in the context of Europe 
2020 and investment on the ground” (European 
Commission, 2012). 
Under the Common Strategic Framework, 
considered as a mandatory ex ante 
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conditionality, for member states and their 
respective regions was the construction of Smart 
Specialization Strategies. According to the 
Cohesion Policy 2014-2020, Smart Specialization 
Strategies (S3) are a prerequisite, but beyond a 
prerequisite, S3 will be the logical rational 
framework, both strategic and tactical, forming 
the basis for the definition of regional/national 
guidelines on social, economic, technological, 
scientific, cultural and regional planning. “In the 
context of Europe 2020, smart specialization 
emerges therefore as a key element for place 
based innovation policies” (European 
Commission, 2012: 8).  
Success in achieving Europe 2020 goals will be 
determined by decisions made at local and 
regional levels, and Regional policy1is vital in 
mobilizing the full innovation potential of EU 
regions (European Commission, 2011:2). Regions 
across Europe have different endowments, 
capabilities and performance. Therefore, there 
are potentially major advantages in using 
strategies that exploit an original and globally 
competitive specialization niche (European 
Commission, 2011:2). Smart Specialization 
Strategies can help regions to concentrate 
resources on a few key Research and Innovation 
(R&I) priorities and ensure more effective use of 
public funds (European Commission, 2011:2). 
Through its "Strategy for Research and 
Innovation for a Smart Specialization 2014-
2020”, Portugal focuses its national smart 
specialization strategy on the following 
economic activities: i) Production technologies 
and production industries; ii) Automotive, 
aeronautics and space; iii) Multi-functional 
forestry; iv) Sustainable fishing; v) Valorization of 
marine ecosystems and links with renewable 
energy; vi) Deep sea mining; v) Coastal tourism, 
culture, sport and leisure; vi) Sustainable 
exploitation of natural resources, especially 
water; vii) Health & health tourism; viii) Tourism 
with a focus on ICTs to create national value 
chains; ix) Clustering of cultural & creative 
industries to achieve impact; x) Eco-construction 
linked to ‘habitat’ IAPMEI, FCT, ANI and 
COMPETE (2014). The S3 Strategic Priorities 
                                                          
1 The EU regional Policy is “a strategic investment policy 
targeting all EU regions and cities in order to boost their 
economic growth and improve people’s quality of life” (EC, 
2014: 1-3). Financial resources are used to support small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SME) to become more 
innovative and competitive, to create new and permanent 
job opportunities, to finance strategic transport and 
communication infrastructures, to modernize the education 
system and to promote a more environmentally-friendly 
economy (EC, 2014: 3). 
adopted by the Alentejo are the following: i) 
Food and forestry; ii) Economy of mineral, 
natural and environmental resources; iii) 
Heritage, cultural and creative industries and 
tourism services; iv) Critical technologies, energy 
and smart mobility; v) Technologies and 
specialized services of the social economy 
CCDRA (2014). 
In the Portuguese Alentejo region, Regional 
Policy instruments, and consequently Smart 
Specialization Strategy, are managed by the 
Commission for Coordination and Regional 
Development of the Alentejo (CCDRA) and 
financial resources are allocated through the 
Alentejo Regional Operational Program (PO 
Alentejo). The present paper focuses on three of 
the nine priorities of this program, these being i) 
Competitiveness and SME internationalization; 
ii) Research, technological development and 
innovation and iii) Employment and economic 
enhancement of endogenous resources.  
An important instrument under the PO Alentejo 
is the Portuguese Innovation Incentive System 
(SI Innovation). At the national level, the SI 
Innovation is included in the National Strategic 
Reference Framework (NSRD) 2007 – 2013 and, 
within this, in the Operational Program for 
Competitiveness Factors (COMPETE). The budget 
allocated to SI Innovation, between 2007 and 
2013, was close to 2 billion euros, which 
represents about 10% of the total NSRD budget 
and 50% of the total COMPETE budget 
(Comissão de Acompanhamento do POFC, 
2015:30).  
By assigning subsidized loans2, the SI Innovation 
has the main goal of promoting firm innovation, 
to boost their internationalization and to 
stimulate qualified entrepreneurship. Public 
support for innovation is given in the last phase 
of the innovation process, when R&D becomes 
patentable (outcomes) and/or gives rise to a 
new marketable service or good. This explains 
why the cost of patent application is an eligible 
expense and R&D expenditure is not subsidized 
under SI Innovation3. 
The beneficiaries of SI Innovation are companies 
from the manufacturing industry, commerce, 
services, tourism, energy, transport and logistics 
sectors. Public support is distributed by means of 
calls, whereby firms submit an application and 
the selection process is based on four main 
                                                          
2 A subsidized loan is a repayable subsidy, as a loan, but 
without any interest and finance charges. 
3 Direct public support for R&D is given under the 
“Incentive System for Technology Research and 
Development in companies”. 
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criteria: i) Quality of the project; ii) Impact of the 
project on the company's competitiveness; iii) 
Contribution of the project to national 
competitiveness and; iv) Contribution of the 
project to regional competitiveness and 
territorial economic cohesion. Within these 
fields, we can highlight the followings 
dimensions in the regulation of SI Innovation: i) 
increased productivity; ii) representativeness in 
the international market; iii) exploitation of R&D 
results; and iv) creation of highly-skilled jobs, 
wealth and employment in the region. 
 
1.2. Productivity, Innovation and Subsidy 
Productivity measures the quantity of output per 
input unit. Capital (K) and Labor (L) are included 
in inputs and output represents the volume of 
production obtained from inputs. When 
productivity involves a measure of value, 
authors commonly use the labor productivity 
concept, which corresponds to the added 
value1per employee (Sakamoto, 2010:49).  
According to Sakamoto (2010:52-53), a main 
reason for improving productivity could be a 
higher standard of living. This author explains 
that standard of living can be improved by 
working fewer hours, higher wages, and more 
and better jobs, and which is possible with an 
increase in labor productivity. From a 
government perspective, there is a clear 
incentive to increase productivity, due to its 
implications for economic development and 
growth. Nevertheless, firms’ motivation for 
increasing productivity is essentially associated 
with competitiveness, because an increase in 
their productivity could lead to the reduction of 
output production cost. Therefore, a main 
question of interest is how firms can improve 
their productivity? 
In order to maximize the impact of inputs on 
output, firms can use technological advances 
and/or increase the skills of their workforce. In 
both cases, they expect a reduction in the time 
to produce each unit of output. Innovation 
appears as a means to develop new technologies 
or processes and is linked to investment (e.g. 
R&D activities or new equipment). 
Financing innovation is often an issue (see e.g. 
Cincera, 2003; Cincera and Ravet, 2010). 
According to Hölzl and Peneder (2013: 734), 
imperfections in capital markets are the second 
cause of underinvestment in innovation 
                                                          
1 Added value represents the production factor 
remuneration (wages, interest and profit) or the revenue 
less intermediate consumption. 
 
activities and firms face financing constraints as 
a result of asymmetric information. Asymmetric 
information in the financial markets is due, on 
one hand, to the risks and uncertainties inherent 
to R&D activities (Cincera and Ravet, 2010), and 
on the other hand, to the entrepreneur’s 
difficulty in providing a clear and credible 
commitment to the investor (Hölzl and Peneder, 
2013: 734). When the quality of a project is not 
easily recognized, investors refuse credit or raise 
the interest rate due to the higher project risk 
(Hölzl and Peneder, 2013: 734). 
Public policies to support entrepreneurship and 
innovation play a vital role when firms have 
difficulties in accessing finance. Erden & 
Holcombe (2005) demonstrated that public 
investment can have a leverage effect on private 
investment, especially when access to bank 
credit is limited. Some firms, particularly small 
and innovative ones, have more constraints and 
difficulties in accessing finance, since they tend 
to have riskier projects and business models 
(Lee, Sameen and Cowling, 2015). In the 
presence of market failings, public support aims 
to fill the financial gap in order to promote 
innovation and competitiveness, through 
increased productivity. However, public 
subsidies can not only have a positive effect on 
firms’ productivity but also a negative one 
(Figure 1).  
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FIGURE 1. IMPACT OF CAPITAL SUBSIDIES ON PRODUCTIVITY 
Capital subsidies 
(grants and tax incentives) 
   
Positive effect  Negative effect 
       
More net investment  Replacement investment  
Lower relative capital 
costs  
Subsidy = higher profits 
+ firms over-reliant on 
subsidies 
       
Additional productive 
capacity  
Modernization of 
capital stock  Overinvest in capital  
Lack of effort from 
manager and worker + 
fail to reorganize 
activities 
       
New product 
More exports 
Better use of economies 
of scale 
 Higher efficiency  
Allocation inefficiencies 
(less than optimal 
allocation of resources 
to maximize benefits) 
 
Technical inefficiencies 
(non-maximization of 
output for a given 
input) 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration based on Bergström (2000) and Harris and Taylor (2005).
On one hand, if subsidies allow firms to invest in 
technological development, firms can increase 
their productive capacity, which combined with 
a better use of economies of scale lead to 
productivity increases (Bergström, 2000:184). On 
the other hand, subsidies can also have a 
function of investment replacement, allowing 
firms to make more efficient use of input 
resources, but without an increase in productive 
capacity (Harris and Taylor, 2005). However, 
subsidies can also make firms less productive for 
at least two reasons: i) first, “because a subsidy 
gives the recipient firms an incentive to change 
the mix of capital and labor” (Bergström, 2000: 
184), through providing capital at a lower 
relative cost or as compensation for new job 
creation. In this case, subsidies can lead to 
allocation inefficiencies if subsidized firms over-
invest in capital (Bergström, 2000: 184) or 
overshoot the optimal amount of employment in 
order to gain a subsidy (Bernini and Pellegrini, 
2011:264); ii) second, subsidization can also 
induce technical inefficiencies, if the subsidy is 
perceived by firms as an additional source of 
profits and if this potential of new income leads 
to a lack of effort by managers and workers 
(Bergström, 2000: 184). In this case, when firms 
are over-reliant on subsidies, they may also tend 
to fail in reorganizing their activities (Harris and 
Taylor, 2005). 
One challenge of EU regional and innovation 
policy is to find a trade-off between employment 
growth and improved productivity. Indeed, some 
authors (Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2012) found a 
negative correlation between the growth of 
labor productivity and employment per capita 
across EU-15. So an increase in employment, 
through new job creation stimulated by 
subsidies, can induce a decrease in labor 
productivity if the employment level grows 
faster than productive capacity. How can 
governments manage this trade-off? How is 
productivity and employment taken into account 
when governments award a grant? Which 
factors are determinant in the allocation of firm 
subsidies? 
 
1.3. Who gets public support? Productivity and 
employment in the selection process 
The scientific literature on regional, industrial 
and innovation policies identifies the following 
main characteristics for firms receiving subsidies: 
age, employment level (firm size), productivity, 
previous experience of receiving subsidies, the 
qualification of human capital, patent stock, past 
R&D activities and export intensity. On average, 
government tends to have two main behaviors 
in the selection process: i) selecting firms that 
are already best performers (e.g. with higher 
levels of exports, patent stock, skilled jobs and 
R&D activities or productivity), based on the 
“picking the winner” principle and ii) financially 
supporting firms characterized by greater 
financial constraints, for instance, smaller firms 
or firms located in the poorest regions. 
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As regards the main target of the paper - 
productivity and employment in the selection 
process - some authors (see e.g. Bergström, 
2000; Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011) found that 
firms selected for grants tend to be less labour 
productive in the pre-intervention period, which 
could be in line with the principle that 
governments choose to help firms with more 
needs, i.e. with a previous lower performance. 
Nevertheless, for other authors, selected firms 
have higher productivity (e.g. Harris and Taylor, 
2005; Sissoko, 2011) or higher productivity 
growth in the year before the subsidy is awarded 
(Karhunen and Huovari, 2015). For those cases, 
one possible explanation could be that more 
productive firms submit better projects.  
Employment level, used to measure firm size, 
could have a positive or negative impact on the 
likelihood of receiving some public support 
(Table 1). Large firms benefit from greater 
innovation and management capacity, which 
means greater potential to reach positive 
economic outcomes (Hud and Hussinger, 2015), 
but typically, policy instruments are more 
focused on providing support to small and 
medium-sized firms (Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 
2011). Indeed, small firms may be more credit-
constrained (Cincera, 2003; Lee et al., 2015), and 
the public agency may be willing to favor small 
firms for this reason (Busom, 2000). 
TABLE 1. PRODUCTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT LEVEL IN A FIRM'S PROBABILITY OF GETTING A SUBSIDY 
Authors Country, policy orientation and model Impact of explanatory variables 
Bergström 
(2000) 
 Sweden 
 Industrial Policy 
 Logit model 
(+) Value added (Y) 
(+) Capital Stock (K = Total assets) 
(+) Number of employees (L) 
(+) Age (= Year firm was founded) 
(-) Productivity (Y/L) 
(+) Capital intensity (K/L) 
Harris and 
Taylor (2005) 
 Ireland 
 Industrial Policy 
 Probit model 
(-) N.° of employees 
(+) Productivity (K/L) 
(+) Age 
Bernini and 
Pellegrini (2011) 
 Italy 
 Regional Policy 
 Logit model 
(-) Productivity (= output per employee) 
(+) and (-) Employment (squared) 
(+) and (-) own Capital (cubed) 
(+) Large firm 
Sissoko (2011) 
 France 
 Innovation Policy 
 Logit model 
(+) Age 
(+) N.° of employees 
(+) Productivity (= TFP) 
(+) Export intensity  
(+) Growth rate of capital investment 
Karhunen and 
Huovari (2015) 
 Finland 
 Innovation Policy 
 Probit model 
(+) Turnover 
(+) N.° of employees 
(+) Labor productivity growth (= value added per employee) 
(+) Export experience 
(-) Foreign capital ownership 
(+) Share of skilled workers 
(+) Subsidy history 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on Bergström (2000), Harris and Taylor (2005), Bernini and Pellegrini (2011), 
Sissoko (2011) and Karhunen and Huovari (2015). 
Turning to the other characteristics of firms 
getting subsidies, young firms also have more 
limited access to the capital market and 
insufficient financial resources to invest in 
innovative projects (Aschhoff, 2009). In order to 
fill the market gap, innovation policy usually 
gives special attention to start-up companies 
(Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 2011). However, 
“more experienced firms are more aware of the 
value of innovation and may present better 
proposals, becoming thus more likely to be 
selected by the agency” (Busom, 2000:126). 
According to Busom (2000: 126), “the fact that 
experience related variables are significant 
suggests that subsidies might not be the best 
policy to induce firms that did not have previous 
R&D activities to get them started”. 
Previous experience in innovation projects, 
measured by past R&D activities or in other 
funding programs, could have a positive impact 
on the probability of receiving (new) public 
support, because public authorities tend to 
follow the “pick the winner” principle, with the 
aim of minimizing the risk of failure (Czarnitzki 
and Fier 2002; Aerts and Thorwarth, 2008; 
Aschhoff, 2009; Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 
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2011). Firms’ patent stock is another indicator of 
successful R&D activities with an expected 
positive impact on the probability of getting a 
subsidy (Aerts and Thorwarth, 2008). 
An additional indicator of the quality of the 
firm’s innovative capacity is the presence of 
highly qualified personnel. Indeed, the ability to 
develop and implement an R&D project is 
strongly related to the skills of the firm’s human 
capital (Blanes and Busom, 2004). 
Firms that are part of an enterprise group are 
more likely to benefit from potential spillover 
effects as a result of network linkages (Czarnitzki 
and Lopes Bento, 2011), which could also 
influence government evaluators to select this 
kind of firm (Hud and Hussinger, 2015). 
However, firms with foreign capital ownership 
are found to be less likely to obtain an 
innovation subsidy (Karhunen and Huovari, 
2015). According to Busom (2000:126), one 
possible explanation could be that core R&D 
activities may be located in another country, and 
those carried out in the country giving the 
subsidy may be mostly focused on development, 
with little innovative content. 
Firms more active in foreign markets, measured 
by export intensity, may also be more innovative 
than others (Aerts and Thorwarth, 2008; 
Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 2011; Sissoko 
(2011); Karhunen and Huovari (2015), Hud and 
Hussinger, 2015) and are consequently more 
likely to achieve higher performance and more 
successful projects.  
In the analysis and model developed in sections 
3 and 4, we include firms’ characteristics in the 
year before submitting the application, such as 
their size, innovative capacity and foreign trade 
experience. Other indicators used by banks 
when assessing credit risk, namely the return on 
equity and the solvency ratio of applicant firms 
(see e.g. Louizis et al., 2012; Chaibi and Ftiti, 
2015), are also included in order to control for 
the effectiveness of SI Innovation in 
counteracting debt and equity financing 
constraints. Indeed, firms with historically lower 
levels of these indicators are less attractive for 
new investors or banks, because they show 
lower performance and more financial 
vulnerability. Macroeconomic factors in the year 
of submitting the application, measured by the 
interest rate in the Portuguese debt capital 
market, regional1GDP variation and the 
concentration of skilled employees are also 
taken into account with the aim of controlling 
                                                          
1 In Alentejo sub-region NUTS level 3. 
for external factors which affect SMEs’ access to 
finance and growth. 
A novelty introduced in the present paper is to 
include in the analysis the investment project 
characteristics, namely the expected impact on 
firm productivity and employment. Indeed, in 
the studies cited above, authors only assess the 
probability of getting a subsidy taking into 
account firms’ characteristics in the year before 
receiving the grant, with few authors providing a 
precise analysis of the process of selecting 
applicants for public support.  
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The analysis is based on the case study of 
Portuguese Innovation Incentive System (SI 
Innovation) and on applications submitted 
between 2007 and 2013 by firms intending to 
implement an investment project in the Alentejo 
region. The sample includes both applications 
evaluated and managed at the regional (450 
observations)2 and national level (177 
observations). 
The dataset was built with cross-information 
extracted from the Information System of the 
NSRF Incentive Scheme, Statistics Portugal (INE) 
and the Bank of Portugal. The first data source 
provided information about firm and application 
characteristics, the second source provided 
information on regional macroeconomic 
conditions and the third source provided 
information concerning the cost of external 
financing in Portugal. 
The methodological approach adopted combines 
several techniques such as descriptive statistics, 
mean differences in a binary choice model and 
cost-effectiveness indicators. Each of these 
techniques plays a specific role in answering the 
research questions initially set. 
Sample description and the t tests on the 
equality of means - between approved and non-
approved applications - are used to answer the 
first research question: Is improved productivity 
and the creation of new jobs contemplated in all 
the applications submitted and selected? 
A binary logit model is used to understand which 
factors influence the probability of having an 
application approved, therefore allowing a 
response to the second research question: How 
have improved productivity and the creation of 
                                                          
2 Previous studies (Santos, Cincera, Neto and Serrano, 
2016a; Santos, Cincera, Neto and Serrano, 2016b) only 
focus on applications evaluated and managed in Alentejo at 
the regional level. 
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new jobs been taken into account in the selection 
process? 
This analysis is based on binary choice models 
because ݕ௜  has only two possible values, coded 
as 1 if the application is approved and 0 if not. 
The model (1) describes the probability of 
receiving public support taking into account the 
individual characteristics of each application (ݔ௜).  
Explanatory variables belong to four groups: i) 
firm characteristics; ii) application 
characteristics; iii) foreseen impact of the 
investment project and iv) macroeconomic 
conditions (for more details see Table 2). 
 
ܲሼݕ௜ = 1|ݔ௜ሽ = ܩ(ݔ௜, ߚ) (1) 
 
The cost-effectiveness indicator, which 
represent the ratio between outcomes (e.g. new 
expected jobs created) and inputs (e.g. 
subsidized loan), lets us estimate the cost 
associated with the creation of new jobs – the 
third research question initially set. 
TABLE 2. VARIABLE NAME AND DESCRIPTION 
 Variable name Variable description 
Fi
rm
s’
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
ist
ic
s 
job_pre Number of employees in the firms in the year before submitting the application. 
firm size Micro, small and medium firms and non-SMEs. Dummy variable. Micro-firms are the omitted reference category. 
nr_partner Number of firm partners. 
solvability_pre Solvability ratio (equity/debt) in the year before submitting the application 
roe_pre Return on Equity ratio (net income/equity) in the year before submitting the application. 
rd_pre_yes Has the company a history of R&D activities in the year before submitting the application? Dummy variable, where Yes = 1 and No = 0. 
patent_ pre_yes Has the company already a patent stock in the year before submitting the application? Dummy variable, where Yes = 1 and No = 0. 
export_pre_yes Has the company a history of R&D activities in the year before submitting the application? Dummy variable, where Yes = 1 and No = 0. 
submit_before Has the company submitted an application to the Innovation Incentive System before this one? Dummy variable, where Yes = 1 and No = 0.  
Pr
oj
ec
t 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s activity sector Activity sector of the application: manufacturing industry, tourism activities, service sector and other. Dummy variable. Other_sectors is the omitted reference category. 
ln_investment Total amount of investment foreseen by the company on the application form. Variable expressed as a logarithm. 
Network Is the project included in the networking project? Dummy variable, where Yes = 1 and No = 0. 
Pr
oj
ec
t i
m
pa
ct
 (f
or
es
ee
n)
 
Productivity 
Variation of labor productivity (difference between gross added value per employee after 
and before project implementation) foreseen as result of the investment project. Values 
expressed in millions of euros. 
skill_job 
Variation of skilled jobs (number) foreseen by the applicant as the result of investment 
project. Under the program regulation, a highly qualified worker is a person with at least a 
post-secondary pre-tertiary level of education. 
no_skill_job Variation in non-skilled jobs (number) foreseen by the applicant as the result of investment project. 
Export Variation in export intensity (ratio between international turnover and total turnover) foreseen by the applicant as the result of investment project. 
Rd Variation in R&D intensity (ratio between R&D expenditure and turnover) foreseen by the applicant as the result of investment project. 
Patent Variation in patent stock per employee foreseen by the applicant as the result of investment project. 
M
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
 
co
nd
iti
on
s 
interest_r Average interest rate in Portugal in the year of submitting the application. 
gdp_var Variation in regional GDP at NUTS 3 level in Alentejo in the year of submitting the application. 
reg_skill_job Share of skilled jobs (proportion of employed population with higher education) at NUTS 3 level in Alentejo in the year of submitting the application. 
Time fixed effect Year of submitting the application. Dummy variable. The year 2008 is the omitted reference category. 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
Note: All monetary variables are at constant price (base 2006). 
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3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
3.1. Data description 
The sample has 627 observations – 450 
applications evaluated and managed at the 
regional level plus 177 applications evaluated 
and managed at the national level - which 
correspond to the number of applications 
submitted to the Portuguese Innovation 
Incentive System, between 2007 and 2013, for 
investment projects located in the Portuguese 
Alentejo region NUTS 2 (Appendix 1). The 
approval rate of applications submitted was 
52%. 
Concerning firms’ characteristics, it appears that 
539 applications were submitted by SMEs, 
representing 86% of all applications submitted 
(50% are micro, 26% are small and 10% are 
medium-sized firms) and 88 applications were 
submitted by non-SMEs, representing 14% of 
applications submitted in the period of 
observation. It seems that applicants are private 
firms, with an average number of three partners 
and nine years of activity. New firms, with no 
activity in the pre-intervention period, submitted 
more than 53% of applications in the Alentejo 
region. About 20% of applications were made by 
firms that had submitted another application to 
the same program previously, which means that 
some firms1 (103 firms in 504 applicants) have 
submitted more than one application. 
Concerning the activity sector, applications 
submitted by firms were distributed as follows: 
manufacturing industry (43%), service sector 
(18%) and tourism activities (31%). Those three 
sectors account for around 92% of the 627 
applications submitted. Only 10% of the 
applications presented by firms are incorporated 
in a networking project. 
The investment considered in the application is 
on average €4.1 million and the subsidized loan 
near to 50% of investment in approved 
applications. Aspirants to public support 
contemplate an increase of 17.6 jobs per 
application and 45% of these new jobs will be 
occupied by skilled workers. 
Regarding innovation indicators, only 3% of 
applicants have a patent portfolio and 10% a 
past of R&D. Only 28% of financial requests are 
submitted by firms with internationalization 
experience. 
The 627 projects in the sample foresaw on 
average an increase in innovation (measured by 
the rise of R&D expenditure and patent stock) 
                                                          
1 The total number of applications submitted is 627 and the 
number of firms applying is 504.  
and competitiveness capacity (regarding export 
intensity and labor productivity growth). Firms 
expect to increase their patent stock by 462.5%, 
R&D activities by 272.6%, export intensity by 
318.2% and labor productivity by 561.5%. 
 
3.2. Productivity and employment in application 
submission 
Almost all the applications submitted (94%) 
predicted an increase in labor productivity and 
the creation of new jobs (Appendix 1). 
Investment projects forecasting an increase in 
skilled jobs are slightly fewer (89%). Excluding 
micro-firms, the number and share of approved 
applications with an increase in labor 
productivity (53% versus 47%) and jobs are 
higher (52% versus 48%)(Appendix 1). 
On average, applicants expect an increase of 
€87.6 thousand in their labor productivity (Table 
3). There is no statistical difference between 
approved and non-approved applications, except 
for medium-sized firms, where the increase in 
labor productivity is expected to be €43.1 
thousand higher. 
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TABLE 3. VARIATION IN LABOR PRODUCTIVITY, EMPLOYMENT LEVEL AND SKILLED JOBS FORESEEN IN 
SUBMITTED APPLICATIONS, BY FIRM SIZE AND STATUS IN SELECTION PROCESS 
  
  
All submitted 
applications 
Approved 
Applications 
Non-approved 
Applications Mean 
diff p-value Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
 Productivity (x€1.000)                   
Micro 311 90.3 139 104.9 172 78.5 26.4 0.182   
Small 163 111.0 92 88.6 71 139.9 -51.3 0.293   
Medium 63 59.3 33 79.9 30 36.7 43.1 0.095 * 
Non-SMEs 90 55.9 26 60.3 26 44.9 15.4 0.611   
Total firms 627 87.6 328 89.1 299 86.0 3.1 0.850   
 Jobs (n.°)                   
 Micro 311 10.1 139 12.5 172 8.2 4.3 0.004 *** 
Small 163 15.1 92 16.6 71 13.1 3.5 0.249   
Medium 63 21.2 33 29.5 30 12.1 17.4 0.046 ** 
Non-SMEs 90 45.6 26 65.8 26 37.4 28.4 0.110   
Total firms 627 17.6 328 20.2 299 14.8 5.5 0.0551  * 
 Skilled jobs (n.°)                   
Micro 311 4.9 139 6.3 172 3.8 2.5 0.000 *** 
Small 163 6.5 92 6.7 71 6.2 0.5 0.754   
Medium 63 6.1 33 8.2 30 3.7 4.5 0.026 ** 
Non-SMEs 90 22.3 26 20.7 26 26.0 -5.3 0.749   
Total firms 627 7.9 328 9.4 299 6.3 3.1 0.169   
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data extracted from Information System of the NSRF Incentive Scheme. 
Note: ***, **, * indicate if the means are significantly different between “approved” and “non-approved” applications at 
the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, based on t-Test. 
The increase in labor productivity is higher for 
micro and small firms compared to medium-
sized firms and non-SMEs and this result is 
statistically significant for all submitted 
applications (€97.4 versus €57.3 thousand) and 
for approved ones (€98.4 versus €66.9 thousand) 
(Table 4). 
 
TABLE 4. DIFFERENCES IN PRODUCTIVITY VARIATION BETWEEN FIRM SIZES 
  
All submitted applications Approved applications 
Micro | micro & 
small | SMEs 
Comparison 
group Diff Mean 
Micro | micro & 
small | SMEs 
Comparison 
group Diff Mean 
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
 Productivity (x€1.000)                         
Micro vs small and medium 311 90.3 226 96.6 -6.3   139 104.9 125 86.3 18.6   
Micro vs non-micro 311 90.3 316 85.0 5.3   139 104.9 189 77.5 27.4   
Micro and small vs  
Medium and non-SME 474 97.4 153 57.3 40.1 ** 231 98.4 97 66.9 31.5 * 
SME vs non-SME 537 92.9 90 55.9 37.1   264 96.1 64 60.3 35.8 * 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data extracted from Information System of the NSRF Incentive Scheme. 
Note: ***, **, * indicate if the means are significantly different between “approved” and “non-approved” applications at 
the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, based on t-Test. 
Concerning increased employment (Tables 3 and 
5), this is on average proportional to firm size, 
bigger firms foreseeing a greater increase in jobs 
and vice-versa (e.g. an average increase of 12.9 
new jobs for SMEs compared to 45.6 new jobs 
for non-SMEs). Applications approved for micro 
and medium-sized firms envisage a statistically 
significant greater increase of jobs (total and 
skilled workers) than those non-approved, 
representing the mean difference of 4.3 and 2.5 
for micro firms and 17.4 and 4.5 for medium-
sized firms. 
On average, around 45% of new jobs created will 
be filled by skilled workers. Micro-firms, 
compared to small and medium-sized firms, 
foresee hiring a higher proportion of skilled 
workers (48.6% versus 37.8%, respectively) and 
this difference is statistically significant. 
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However, when analysing approved applications 
this trend is not statistically significant, which 
means that in the end (after the selection 
process) the increase in the proportion of skilled 
workers is greater in bigger firms (Table 5). 
TABLE 5. DIFFERENCES IN EMPLOYMENT VARIATION BETWEEN FIRM SIZES 
 All submitted applications Approved applications 
Micro | micro 
& small | 
SMEs 
Comparison 
group 
Diff Mean  Micro | micro & 
small | SMEs 
Comparison 
group 
Diff Mean  
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
 Jobs (n.°)                        
Micro vs small 
and medium 311 10.1 226 16.8 -6.7 *** 139 12.5 125 20.0 7.5 *** 
Micro vs non-
micro 311 10.1 316 25.0 -14.9 *** 139 12.5 189 25.9 -13.4 *** 
Micro and small 
vs medium and 
non-SME 
474 11.8 153 35.6 -23.8 *** 231 14.1 97 34.7 -20.6 *** 
SME vs non-
SME 537 12.9 90 45.6 -32.7 *** 264 16.0 64 37.4 -21.4 *** 
 Skilled jobs 
(n.°)                       
Micro vs small 
and medium 311 4.9 226 6.3 -1.4 ** 139 6.3 125 7.1 0.4  
Micro vs non-
micro 311 4.9 316 10.9 -6.0 *** 139 3.3 189 11.7 -8.4 * 
Micro and small 
vs medium and 
non-SME 
474 5.4 153 15.6 -10.1 *** 231 6.4 97 16.5 -10.0 *** 
SME vs non-
SME 537 5.5 90 22.3 -16.7 *** 264 6.7 64 20.7 -14.1 *** 
 Share skilled 
jobs (%) =  
skilled jobs /  
jobs 
                      
Micro vs small 
and medium 311 48.6% 226 37.8% 10.8% ** 139 50.3% 125 35.4% 14.9%  
Micro vs non-
micro 311 48.6% 316 43.5% 5.1% *** 139 26.3% 189 45.2% -18.8% * 
Micro and small 
vs medium and 
non-SME 
474 46.1% 153 43.8% 2.3% *** 231 45.6% 97 47.4% -1.8% *** 
SME vs non-
SME 537 42.7% 90 48.8% -6.0% *** 264 41.5% 64 55.3% -13.8% *** 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data extracted from “Information System of the NSRF Incentive Scheme”. 
Note: ***, **, * indicate if the means are significantly different between ‘approved’ and ‘non-approved’ 
applications at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, based on t-Test. 
3.3. Determinants of selection process 
Regarding the correlation matrix (Appendix 2), 
we can identify a moderate to high correlation 
between some variables. Firm age is positively 
correlated with firm size, measured by the 
number of employees (corr = 0.4) and with 
previous experience in foreign trade (corr = 0.6). 
Firm size is also highly correlated with the 
number of skilled workers (corr = 0.9) and with 
the expected impact on total new job creation 
(corr = 0.6) and new skilled jobs (corr = 0.8). A 
high correlation also exists between the number 
of skilled jobs and the foreseen increase in this 
workforce (corr = 0.9). Patent stock per 
employee is negatively correlated with the 
foreseen increase in patent stock (corr = - 0.5). 
R&D intensity is very highly correlated with the 
foreseen increase in R&D intensity (corr = -0.9). 
To sum up, this means that older firms are 
bigger and are also more likely to sell in foreign 
markets. Bigger firms have a higher number of 
skilled employees and foresee a greater increase 
in the total number of new workers. Firms with a 
higher number of skilled jobs forecast a greater 
rise in this category of workforce. Entities with a 
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higher patent stock per employee predict a 
lower increase and similarly firms with lower 
R&D intensity predict a higher increase. 
In order to avoid potential problems of 
multicollinearity, the number of employees in 
the year before submitting an application was 
not included in the model and firm size was 
transformed in a categorical variable, according 
to the EC recommendation of 6 May 2003 
concerning the definition of micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises. Firms’ age and the 
number of skilled employees in the pre-
intervention period were also not included in the 
model, due to their moderate-high correlation 
with other variables. The characterization of firm 
patent stock and R&D intensity before a 
subsidized loan were transformed in a binary 
variable, which assumes a value of 1 if firms 
have a patent stock or R&D intensity and 0 
otherwise. 
The final model (2) used to assess which factors 
influence the decision to approve an application, 
under the SI Innovation in Alentejo region, takes 
into account the two main dimensions in 
analysis – increased productivity and 
employment level – and also other selection 
criteria mentioned in the program regulation, 
such as representation in the international 
market and exploitation of R&D results. As 
mentioned previously in section 3, firm and 
investment project characteristics, as well as 
macroeconomic factors, were also included in 
the model.  
 
Pr(Approved application = 1| … )  
=  G(ߚ଴ +  ߚଵݏ݈݈݉ܽ +  ߚଶ݉݁݀݅ݑ݉ +  ߚଷ݊݋ ݏ݉݁ + ߚସ݌ܽݎݐ݊݁ݎ +  ߚହݎ݋݁ +  ߚ଺ݏ݋݈ݒ
+  ߚ଻݁ݔ݌ܵܫ +  ߚ଼݁ݔ݌݋ݎݐܲݎ݁ +  ߚଽݎ&݀ܲݎ݁ +  ߚଵ଴݌ܽݐ݁݊ݐܲݎ݁ +  ߚଵଵ݊݁ݐݓ݋ݎ݇݅݊݃
+ ߚଵଶ ln ݅݊ݒ݁ݏݐ +  ߚଵଷݏ݈݈݇݅ ݆݋ܾ +  ߚଵସݏ݈݈݇݅ ݆݋ܾଶ +  ߚଵହ݊݋ ݏ݈݈݇݅ ݆݋ܾ
+  ߚଵ଺݁ݔ݌݋ݎݐܽݐ݅݋݊ +  ߚଵ଻݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ +  ߚଵ଼ݎ݀ ݅݊ݐ݁݊ݏ݅ݐݕ +  ߚଵଽ݌ܽݐ݁݊ݐ
+  ߚଶ଴ݏ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ௜ +  ߚଶଵܻ݁ܽݎ௜) 
 
(2) 
Table 6 shows the coefficients and marginal 
effects of Logit estimations. Model 1 includes 
time and sector fixed effects. Model 2 contains 
independent variables linked with 
macroeconomic conditions and sector fixed 
effects. Due to the moderate-high correlation 
between macroeconomic variables and time 
fixed effects, these were not included in Model 
2. 
The result of the Ramsey test, for omitted 
variables, and of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test 
illustrate that the models are correctly specified 
and the functional forms are correct (Table 7). 
No problem of heteroscedasticity and 
multicollinearity was detected, based on the 
White Test and on the results of variance 
inflation factors (VIF) for the independent 
variables. So the coefficients and marginal effect 
can be interpreted correctly. 
Assessment of the results starts with the impact 
of productivity and employment variation on the 
probability of having an application approved. 
The variation in skilled jobs, as a result of the 
investment project, shows an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with the probability of receiving the 
public incentive. This means that increasing the 
number of skilled jobs has a positive effect on 
the decision to fund an investment project, but 
at a higher level the effect tends to inverse and 
the probability of having an application selected 
decreases. In contrast, the variation in non-
skilled jobs shows a small but significant 
negative impact on the outcome variable, but 
only when time fixed effects are used in the 
model. This difference between both variables 
(skilled and non-skilled worker variation) could 
reveal a government preference for increasing 
only qualified employment. However, the 
preference for funding projects which foresee a 
greater increase of this workforce has its limits, 
perhaps because hiring a higher number of new 
skilled workers could be riskier due to requiring 
a larger additional income to justify this and to 
make new jobs profitable. 
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TABLE 6. LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coef. St. Error dy/dx Coef. St. Error dy/dx 
Small 0.057   0.257 0.011 0.116   0.259 0.021 
Medium -0.869 ** 0.390 -0.159 -0.734 * 0.387 -0.134 
no_sme 0.414   0.379 0.076 0.441   0.378 0.081 
nr_partner 0.144 *** 0.050 0.026 0.142 *** 0.050 0.026 
roe_pre -0.047   0.129 -0.009 -0.040   0.128 -0.007 
solv_pre -0.002   0.003 0.000 -0.002   0.003 0.000 
exp_si 0.546 ** 0.253 0.100 0.574 ** 0.251 0.105 
export_pre_yes 0.966 *** 0.296 0.177 0.836 *** 0.292 0.153 
rd_pre_yes 0.612   0.390 0.112 0.685 * 0.387 0.125 
pat_pre_yes -0.265   0.742 -0.049 -0.222   0.750 -0.041 
Networking 1.715 *** 0.389 0.315 1.787 *** 0.374 0.327 
ln_invest 0.363 *** 0.091 0.067 0.336 *** 0.090 0.061 
var_skill_job 0.035 *** 0.016 0.006 0.035 ** 0.016 0.006 
var_skill_job2 -8.39E-05 ** 3.44E-05 0.000 -8.32E-05 ** 3.45E-05 0.000 
var_no_skill_job -0.008 * 0.004 -0.001 -0.007   0.004 -0.001 
diff_export 1.714 *** 0.406 0.314 1.542 *** 0.398 0.282 
diff_gav_job -0.752   0.477 -0.138 -0.627   0.466 -0.115 
diff_rd_intensity 0.086   0.067 0.016 0.069   0.055 0.013 
diff_patent_stock 2.020 ** 0.959 0.371 2.213 ** 0.979 0.405 
interest_r -   - - -0.479 *** 0.156 -0.088 
reg_job_skill -   - - -0.289 *** 0.075 -0.053 
gdp_var -   - - 6.231 ** 2.699 1.140 
Constant -4.326 *** 0.719   2.380   1.513   
Observations 622 622 
Time fixed effects YES NO 
Sector fixed effects YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.2140 0.2157 
Log likelihood -338.12 -337.41 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on STATA output. 
Note: ***, **, * significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
TABLE 7. RESULTS OF SPECIFICATION TEST 
 Model 1 Model 2 
% Correctly classified 74.1% 73.2% 
Mean VIF 1.47 1.37 
Ramsey Test 0.41 0.11 
Hosmer–Lemeshow test 0.72 0.58 
White Test 0.07 0.15 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on STATA output. 
The impact of investment projects on firm 
productivity in Model 1 and Model 2 is not a 
determinant factor in the selection process (not 
significant variable). However, as we saw in 
section 4.2, it is possible to have different 
behavior according to firm size. When 
interaction terms are introduced (see 
estimations in Appendix 3), the results show that 
in applications submitted by SME, the foreseen 
variation in firms’ productivity has a negative 
impact on the likelihood of receiving public 
support1. One possible explanation could be that 
in the selection process, new job creation has 
greater priority than increased labor 
productivity. 
                                                          
1 In the presence of interaction terms, the coefficient 
no_sme is conditional to var_gav_job equaling zero and, in 
the same way, the coefficient var_gav_job is conditional to 
no_sme being equal to zero. In turn, the interaction term 
coefficient estimates the difference between the effect of 
var_gav_job when firms are no_sme and the effect of 
var_gav_job when firms are not no_sme. In Model 10 the 
interaction term and no_sme categories are both non-
significant variables so interpretation only concerns the 
coefficient of var_gav_job, which represents the effect 
when no_sme = 0 (or sme = 1). 
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Different behavior according to firms’ size, 
concerning the impact of skilled jobs on 
outcome, can also to be seen in the logit 
estimation in Appendix 3. The effect of this 
explanatory variable is negative for small firms 
and positive for medium firms, compared to the 
reference category (other firms). A minor non-
linear relationship, similar to Model 1 and Model 
2, was found for SMEs compared to non-SMEs in 
Model 9. These results could suggest two things. 
First, the increase in skilled jobs is only a 
relevant criterion for SMEs, because in the pre-
intervention period they are less performing in 
terms of a qualified workforce1. Second, within 
the SME category, the impact of skilled jobs on 
the likelihood of being funded is higher for 
medium-sized than for micro and small-firms, 
perhaps because despite micro and small-firms 
being most in need they do not have the 
structural capacity to increase skilled jobs at the 
same level as medium-sized ones. 
Regarding the other firm and application 
characteristics in the selection process, firm size, 
measured by categorical variables, is not always 
significant. Only medium-sized firms are less 
likely to get a subsidy than micro-firms. The 
number of firm partners, which in our sample is 
linked with smaller firms, also has a positive 
impact. So on average, the neediest firms are 
more likely to obtain public support, which 
reveals, as Busom (2000) highlighted, that public 
agencies favor small firms, because they are 
more financially constrained (effective selection 
process). 
Previous experience in the SI Innovation 
procedure increases the probability of having an 
application approved by 10%. The positive 
relationship between experience of subsidies 
and being a funded firm was demonstrated by 
other authors, such as Aerts and Thorwarth 
(2008), Aschhoff (2009) and Hud and Hussinger 
(2015), based on the “pick the winner” principle. 
Nevertheless, in our model this conclusion is not 
necessarily good news. On one hand, this could 
reveal that the public incentive goes more to the 
same companies, and that firms could receive 
more than one subvention under the SI 
Innovation. Or it could reveal that firms familiar 
with the application process could have easier 
access to public support because they know 
which factors to emphasize on the application 
form. 
                                                          
1 Bigger firms, measured by the number of employees, are 
those with a higher number of skilled workers (corr = 0.9). 
 
The amount of investment has a positive impact 
on the probability of being funded. If we take 
into account that, firstly, the amount of 
investment represents the sum of public 
incentive (percentage of the eligible investment) 
and private expenditure (equal to the 
remainder), and secondly, the aim of the 
program is to stimulate innovative investment, it 
is expected that government will tend to 
approve applications with a higher amount of 
expenditure because this implies a greater 
private effort. This conclusion is also in line with 
Aerts and Thorwarth (2008:13), who found that 
receiving a subsidy has a positive impact on R&D 
efforts because funded companies show higher 
R&D expenditure than non-funded ones. 
Similarly, Santos, Serrano and Neto (2015) also 
find that the amount of funded investment has a 
positive impact on the probability of firm 
survival, because higher investments tend to be 
better planned. Because they are more risky, 
they need a higher additional cash-flow to be 
economically viable. So when governments 
choose to fund projects with a higher amount of 
investment, this tends to maximize the outcome: 
greater private effort and a low failure rate. 
Firms’ innovative capacity is assessed by R&D 
intensity in the pre-intervention period and by 
the foreseen increase in patent stock per 
employee. In turn, having a patent portfolio 
before submitting an application and foreseeing 
an increase in R&D activities are not taken into 
account in the selection process (not significant 
variables). These results are line with the 
objective of the program to support innovation 
in the last phase of the process, when R&D 
becomes patentable and/or gives rise to a new 
marketable service or good. 
Previous experience in foreign trade increases 
the probability of having an application 
approved, as also found by Aerts and Thorwarth 
(2008) and Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento (2011). 
Parallel to this, the foreseen difference in export 
intensity also shows, as expected, a positive 
impact on that likelihood. Indeed, one goal of 
the program is to boost firms’ presence in 
international markets, and in order to ensure 
this, selection is based on a “pick the winner” 
principle, those already best performing are the 
ones most likely to achieve this goal. 
Factors that influence the credit risk and the 
decision to give a bank loan, such as solvability 
ratio and return on equity, seem not to influence 
the government evaluator in funding projects.  
Finally, introducing regional macroeconomic 
characteristics in the analysis, the results of 
Model 2 show that when the Portuguese 
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financial market has a lower interest rate and 
when the regional economy shows a growth in 
GDP, the probability of having an application 
approved increases. This could suggest a 
complementary effect of the public instrument 
in order to accelerate growth in periods when 
capital is available at a lower price. On the other 
hand, investment projects located in regions 
with a lower share of skilled workers are less 
likely to be financially supported by the program, 
which reveals an effective selection process 
because the neediest regions are helped most. 
3.4. Distribution of subsidized loans and cost of new 
jobs 
Concerning the distribution of subsidized loans 
by firm size, Table 8 shows that within SME 
categories the amount of public support per 
employee decreases when firm size increases 
and this is also the case for the average amount 
of investment per employee. The share of 
subsidized loans is also greater for smaller firms, 
which means it decreases when firm size 
increases.  
TABLE 8. INVESTMENT, SUBSIDIZED LOAN AND COST OF NEW JOBS, BY FIRM SIZE AND ACTIVITY SECTOR, IN APPROVED APPLICATIONS 
Categories 
Investment  
by job [1] 
Subsidized loan  
by jobs [1] 
Share of  
subsidized loan loan/new jobs [2] 
Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Max Obs Mean 
Average (all firms) 324 157,525 € 324 71,601 € 328 50% 75% 307 135,670 € 
Firm size                   
Micro 139 174,694 € 139 93,197 € 139 56% 75% 136 109,509 € 
Small 91 131,555 € 91 62,983 € 92 51% 75% 86 126,946 € 
Medium 33 73,539 € 33 35,863 € 33 48% 65% 30 123,609 € 
Non SMEs 61 202,580 € 61 54,581 € 64 37% 60% 55 220,579 € 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data extracted from Information System of the NSRF Incentive Scheme. 
Note: [1] Ratio between investment (or subsidized loan) by employment level in post-intervention period.[2] Only 
estimated for firms predicting an increase in employment. 
Subsidized firms take financial advantage of the 
public support twice. Firstly, subsidized loans 
have no cost (loan without any interest and 
finance charges). Secondly, if firms meet the 
financial targets planned in the application, up to 
75% of the subsidized loan could be transformed 
in a grant. The cost-effectiveness ratio between 
the amount of subsidized loan (input) and new 
jobs created (outcome) gives a proxy variable for 
the cost of new jobs. Tables 8 and 9 show that 
the amount of subsidized loan granted per new 
job created is surprisingly higher for bigger firms 
and especially for non-SMEs than for SMEs. On 
average, non-SMEs received a lower amount of 
subsidy by employment level (Table 8), but they 
are awarded more per new job created (Table 9). 
TABLE 9. DIFFERENCE IN SUBSIDIZED LOAN PER NEW JOB BETWEEN FIRM SIZES 
 
Micro | micro & small 
| SMEs Comparison group Diff mean 
Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Micro vs small 136 109,509 € 86 126,946 € -17,437 €  
Micro vs small & medium 136 109,509 € 116 126,083 € -16,574 €  
Micro vs non-micro 136 109,509 € 171 156,477 € -46,968 € ** 
Micro & small vs medium & non-SME 222 116,264 € 85 186,355 € -70,091 € *** 
SME vs non-SME 252 117,138 € 55 220,579 € -103,441 € ** 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data extracted from Information System of the NSRF Incentive Scheme. 
Note: Only estimated for those foreseeing increased employment.***, **, * indicate if the means are significantly different 
between groups at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, based on t-Test. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The Portuguese Innovation Incentive System was 
an important instrument of the Portuguese 
National Strategic Reference Framework 2007-
2013, developed with the aim of stimulating 
innovation and promoting competitiveness.  
Between 2007 and 2013, 627 applications to SI 
Innovation were submitted for investment 
projects in Alentejo region. Almost all the 
applications (94%) foresaw an increase in labour 
productivity and the creation of new jobs. The 
328 applications approved foresaw an 
investment of €1.837 million, at constant price 
(base = 2006), and the creation of more than 
6.600 new jobs in the region. 
The selection process seems to focus more on 
increasing the international competitiveness of 
Alentejo firms, measured by improved export 
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intensity, and by the foreseen innovative 
capacity of applicants in transforming R&D 
results into patentable products. Surprisingly, 
the expected project impact on productivity has 
a negative effect on SMEs’ probability of being 
funded by the program. This means that firms 
which forecast a lower increase in productivity 
are those most likely to have an application 
approved. On the other hand, the project’s 
estimated effect on employment has a different 
impact on the probability of having an 
application selected depending on qualifications 
and on firm size. On average, hiring new skilled 
employees has a positive effect on the likelihood 
of having an application approved, whereas 
increasing the number of non-skilled jobs has a 
negative one. The qualifications of the new 
workforce is only a relevant criterion for SMEs.   
Government evaluators adopt a “picking the 
winner principle” regarding foreign trade 
experience and the amount of investment in the 
project, which means they are cautious and 
select projects with a potentially low risk of 
failure in order to maximize the expected 
outcome. Nonetheless, entities in charge of 
evaluating applications prefer to finance the 
neediest firms and projects implemented in the 
neediest regions. Smaller firms (micro versus 
medium firms) and projects implemented in 
more disadvantaged regions for a qualified 
workforce are more likely to have an application 
approved. Firm characteristics influencing credit 
risk, such as profitability and solvency ratio, are 
not relevant factors in being selected for 
innovation subsidies, which means that firms’ 
financial performance in the pre-intervention 
period is not relevant. 
Public support for innovation in the Portuguese 
Alentejo region seems to be complementary to 
macroeconomic trends, when the cost of capital 
in the market is lower and the regional economy 
is growing, the probability of having an 
application approved increases. 
The cost of new jobs created, measured by the 
amount of subsidized loan per new job, is 
surprisingly higher for bigger firms. For example, 
comparing non-SMEs (220.579€) with SMEs 
(117.138€), we can see that the former has a 
significantly higher cost (almost double) for the 
government, measured at least by exemption 
from interest and financial charges on the loan. 
This result suggests that the share of subsidized 
loans awarded to non-SMEs is not the most 
effective, because they are less financially 
constrained than smaller firms. 
To sum up, the paper makes an assessment of 
how the expected impact on firm productivity 
and employment is taken into account, when 
firms apply for public funding for innovation, 
controlling for other factors. Regarding the main 
dimension analysed, we can conclude that a 
trade-off between higher levels of employment 
and productivity is necessary, in order to achieve 
growth and competitiveness in the region. 
Future research should attempt to expand the 
present analysis to all applications submitted to 
SI Innovation between 2007 and 2013 in 
Portugal, in order to assess if some differences 
exist between Portuguese regions. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
TABLE I. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Micro 627 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Small 627 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Medium 627 0.10 0.30 0 1 
no_sme 627 0.14 0.35 0 1 
nr_partner 627 2.93 2.13 1 13 
Age 627 9.09 14.14 0 101.6 
nat_cap 627 0.90 0.27 0 1 
job_pre 627 44.11 227.09 0 3475 
var_job 627 17.62 35.62 -31 399 
var_no_skill_job 627 9.70 27.61 -118 400 
skill_job_pre 627 6.21 39.56 0 670 
var_skill_job 627 7.92 28.31 -2 480 
gav_job_pre 627 15.59 59.21 -476.0 1089.5 
diff_gav_job_pre 627 0.09 0.21 -1.1 3.6 
roe_pre 627 0.02 0.68 -12.5 4.2 
solv_pre 627 3.90 45.86 -0.8 1102.9 
rd_int_pre 625 0.14 2.09 0 47.1 
diff_rd_int 625 -0.13 2.08 -47.1 0.1 
rd_pre_yes 627 0.10 0.31 0 1 
export_int_pre 627 0.11 0.25 0 1.0 
diff_export 627 0.35 0.31 -0.4 1.0 
export_pre_yes 627 0.28 0.45 0 1 
patent_stock_pre 625 0.01 0.09 0 2 
diff_patent_stock 624 0.02 0.14 -1.9 1.5 
pat_pre_yes 627 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Invest 627 4167.44 12306.40 9.03 199815 
industry_g 627 0.43 0.50 0 1 
service_g 627 0.18 0.39 0 1 
trade_g 627 0.04 0.18 0 1 
tourism_g 627 0.31 0.46 0 1 
all_other_sector_g 627 0.04 0.19 0 1 
interest_rate 627 6.67 0.70 5.4 7.6 
reg_job_skill 627 11.52 1.41 8.6 13.1 
gdp_var 627 -0.02 0.04 -0.16 0.14 
y_2007 627 0.00 0.06 0 1 
y_2008 627 0.17 0.38 0 1 
y_2009 627 0.10 0.31 0 1 
y_2010 627 0.11 0.31 0 1 
y_2011 627 0.19 0.39 0 1 
y_2012 627 0.20 0.40 0 1 
y_2013 627 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data extracted from “Information System of the NSRF Incentive Scheme”. 
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TABLE II. APPLICATIONS (N. ° AND %) WITH A FORESEEN INCREASE IN LABOR PRODUCTIVITY, EMPLOYMENT LEVEL AND SKILLED JOBS, 
BY FIRM SIZE AND STATUS IN SELECTION PROCESS 
 All submitted applications Approved applications Non-approved applications 
N.° applications % Total [1] N.° applications % Total [2] N.° applications % Total [2] 
Productivity> 0       
 Micro 297 95% 133 45% 164 55% 
Small 156 96% 91 58% 65 42% 
Medium 62 98% 33 53% 29 47% 
Non-SME 76 84% 57 75% 19 25% 
Total firms 591 94% 314 53% 277 47% 
New jobs       
Micro 304 98% 136 45% 168 55% 
Small 152 93% 86 57% 66 43% 
 Medium 56 89% 30 54% 26 46% 
Non-SME 79 88% 55 70% 24 30% 
Total firms 591 94% 307 52% 284 48% 
New skilled jobs       
Micro 284 91% 128 45% 156 55% 
Small 144 88% 85 59% 59 41% 
Medium 54 86% 28 52% 26 48% 
Non-SME 78 87% 56 72% 22 28% 
Total firms 560 89% 297 53% 263 47% 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data extracted from “Information System of the NSRF Incentive Scheme”. 
Note: [1] Share compared to all submitted applications by firm size. [2] Share compared to all submitted applications with a 
foreseen increase in productivity or new jobs or new skilled jobs by firm size. 
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Appendix 2. Correlation matrix 
TABLE III. CORRELATION MATRIX 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
1 = Micro 1.00 
2 = Small -0.59 1.00 
3 = medium -0.33 -0.20 1.00 
4 = no_sme -0.41 -0.24 -0.14 1.00 
5 = Age -0.39 0.02 0.19 0.37 1.00 
6 = nr_partner -0.16 0.27 0.11 -0.22 0.03 1.00 
7 = exp_si -0.03 -0.06 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.07 1.00 
8 = networking 0.09 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.08 1.00 
9 = Invest -0.16 -0.07 -0.04 0.35 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 1.00 
10 = roe_pre -0.01 0.01 -0.08 0.07 0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 1.00 
11 = solv_pre -0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 1.00 
12 = job_pre -0.19 -0.09 0.03 0.35 0.39 -0.09 0.14 -0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.01 1.00 
13 = var_job -0.21 -0.04 0.03 0.32 0.11 -0.02 0.08 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.00 0.56 1.00 
14 = skill_job_pre -0.14 -0.06 0.01 0.27 0.34 -0.07 0.12 -0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.94 0.52 1.00 
15 = var_skill_job -0.11 -0.03 -0.02 0.21 0.19 -0.04 0.10 -0.02 0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.81 0.65 0.90 1.00 
16 = gav_job_pre -0.14 -0.01 0.06 0.16 0.22 0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.15 0.22 0.07 0.05 1.00 
17 = diff_gav_job_pre 0.01 0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.18 0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.15 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 0.05 -0.31 1.00 
18 = rd_pre -0.13 -0.06 0.01 0.25 0.18 -0.08 0.11 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.28 0.17 0.22 0.11 0.14 -0.06 1.00 
19 = diff_rd -0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.11 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.43 0.02 0.03 0.25 -0.03 0.11 1.00 
20 = rd_pre_yes -0.21 -0.07 0.13 0.28 0.31 -0.03 0.09 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 0.30 0.17 0.26 0.16 0.15 -0.07 0.43 0.13 1.00 
21 = patent_stock_pre 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.06 1.00 
22 = diff_patent_stock 0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 0.07 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.49 1.00 
23 = pat_pre_yes -0.09 -0.04 0.09 0.09 0.06 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.49 -0.02 0.23 0.47 -0.09 1.00 
24 = export_int_pre -0.28 -0.02 0.24 0.22 0.32 -0.02 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.21 0.12 0.17 0.06 0.15 -0.08 0.30 0.09 0.35 0.01 0.03 0.17 1.00 
25 = diff_export 0.15 0.05 -0.07 -0.22 -0.36 0.09 -0.06 0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.21 0.02 -0.19 -0.03 -0.15 0.28 -0.14 -0.01 -0.17 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.42 1.00 
26 = export_pre_yes -0.42 0.06 0.31 0.25 0.57 0.04 0.11 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.26 0.05 0.20 0.06 0.20 -0.15 0.23 0.04 0.39 -0.02 -0.02 0.15 0.69 -0.44 1.00 
27 = y_2007 -0.06 0.10 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.03 1.00 
28 = y_2008 -0.09 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.09 -0.03 -0.14 -0.15 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.08 0.03 0.11 0.08 -0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 -0.21 0.04 -0.03 1.00 
29 = y_2009 0.05 -0.07 0.06 -0.03 0.03 -0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.11 -0.05 -0.02 -0.15 1.00 
30 = y_2010 -0.03 -0.08 0.04 0.11 0.07 -0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.17 0.08 0.18 0.15 0.02 -0.04 0.14 -0.03 0.04 0.11 -0.01 0.09 0.02 -0.11 0.06 -0.02 -0.16 -0.12 1.00 
31 = y_2011 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.09 -0.09 -0.05 0.09 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.22 -0.16 -0.17 1.00 
32 = y_2012 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.08 0.01 0.10 0.09 0.28 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 0.06 0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.23 -0.17 -0.17 -0.24 1.00 
33 = y_2013 0.00 0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.09 0.12 0.10 -0.18 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.24 -0.04 -0.03 -0.25 -0.18 -0.19 -0.26 -0.27 1.00 
34 = interest_rate -0.04 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.05 0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.06 0.01 -0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.64 -0.47 -0.61 0.16 0.29 -0.22 1.00 
35 = gdp_var 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.15 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.05 -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.40 -0.36 -0.33 0.31 -0.40 1.00 
36 = reg_job_skill 0.05 0.05 -0.05 -0.10 -0.10 0.13 0.12 0.10 -0.08 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.13 -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 0.27 -0.04 -0.12 -0.69 -0.33 -0.08 0.01 0.44 0.51 -0.16 -0.02 1.00 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data extracted from “Information System of the NSRF Incentive Scheme”. 
Note: Observation = 624. 
  
 
27 
Public Policy Portuguese Journal, Volume 1, Number 1, 2016 27 
Appendix 3. Robustness test with interaction terms 
TABLE IV. LOGIT RESULTS WITH INTERACTION TERMS BY FIRM SIZE 
Variables 
Model 5 Model 7 Model 9 Model 6 Model 8 MODEL 10 
Small Medium Non SMEs Small Medium NON SMES 
Coef St. Error Coef St. Error Coef St. Error Coef St. Error Coef St. Error Coef St. Error 
Small 0.374 (0.293) 0.0653 (0.257) 0.0572 (0.257) 0.190 (0.284) 0.0524 (0.257) 0.0601 (0.258) 
Médium -0.853** (0.393) -1.466*** (0.493) -0.865** (0.389) -0.826** (0.392) -1.091** (0.468) -0.894** (0.391) 
no_sme 0.398 (0.382) 0.499 (0.381) 0.298 (0.441) 0.445 (0.380) 0.408 (0.379) 0.249 (0.409) 
nr_partner 0.142*** (0.0503) 0.151*** (0.0507) 0.145*** (0.0502) 0.142*** (0.0504) 0.145*** (0.0503) 0.142*** (0.0503) 
roe_pre -0.0589 (0.130) -0.0672 (0.129) -0.0444 (0.129) -0.0467 (0.129) -0.0354 (0.131) -0.0519 (0.130) 
solv_pre -0.00224 (0.00270) -0.00232 (0.00274) -0.00227 (0.00270) -0.00222 (0.00269) -0.00226 (0.00269) -0.00223 (0.00269) 
exp_si 0.541** (0.254) 0.531** (0.254) 0.547** (0.253) 0.535** (0.253) 0.550** (0.253) 0.551** (0.253) 
export_pre_yes 0.958*** (0.297) 0.970*** (0.298) 0.965*** (0.296) 0.948*** (0.296) 0.976*** (0.296) 0.995*** (0.298) 
rd_pre_yes 0.630 (0.393) 0.634 (0.398) 0.620 (0.391) 0.631 (0.391) 0.611 (0.391) 0.637 (0.391) 
pat_pre_yes -0.272 (0.741) -0.237 (0.751) -0.267 (0.741) -0.243 (0.743) -0.210 (0.748) -0.247 (0.742) 
Eec 1.717*** (0.391) 1.769*** (0.393) 1.718*** (0.389) 1.706*** (0.389) 1.720*** (0.389) 1.711*** (0.390) 
ln_invest 0.342*** (0.0922) 0.374*** (0.0918) 0.363*** (0.0911) 0.353*** (0.0922) 0.363*** (0.0912) 0.354*** (0.0914) 
small_var_skill_job -0.0540** (0.0237) - - - - - - - - - - 
medium_var_skill_job - - 0.110* (0.0576) - - - - - - - - 
no_sme_var_skill_job - - - - 0.0153 (0.0300) - - - - - - 
var_skill_job 0.0612*** (0.0210) 0.0257 (0.0158) 0.0314* (0.0174) 0.0369** (0.0162) 0.0337** (0.0161) 0.0359** (0.0161) 
var_skill_job2 -0.000137*** (4.46e-05) -6.56e-05* (3.39e-05) -0.000107* (5.90e-05) -8.70e-05** (3.47e-05) -8.08e-05** (3.46e-05) -8.43e-05** (3.44e-05) 
var_no_skill_job -0.00867* (0.00448) -0.0101** (0.00469) -0.00766* (0.00413) -0.00731* (0.00410) -0.00791* (0.00410) -0.00634 (0.00430) 
diff_export 1.721*** (0.407) 1.720*** (0.407) 1.716*** (0.406) 1.689*** (0.407) 1.672*** (0.409) 1.743*** (0.408) 
small_diff_gav_job_post - - - - - - -0.00122 (0.00119) - - - - 
medium_diff_gav_job_post - - - - - - - - 0.00422 (0.00528) - - 
no_sme_diff_gav_job_post - - - - - - - - -   0.00282 (0.00266) 
diff_gav_job_1000 -0.583 (0.495) -0.753 (0.489) -0.719 (0.480) -0.107 (0.777) -0.779 (0.486) -0.828* (0.495) 
diff_rd_intensity 0.0870 (0.0678) 0.0866 (0.0688) 0.0858 (0.0669) 0.0871 (0.0668) 0.0848 (0.0673) 0.0868 (0.0671) 
diff_patent_stock 2.049** (0.959) 2.025** (0.957) 2.020** (0.960) 2.022** (0.962) 2.008** (0.963) 2.061** (0.974) 
industry_g 0.492* (0.270) 0.492* (0.270) 0.515* (0.269) 0.478* (0.271) 0.507* (0.269) 0.498* (0.269) 
service_g 0.851*** (0.301) 0.856*** (0.299) 0.886*** (0.300) 0.837*** (0.301) 0.872*** (0.299) 0.874*** (0.299) 
trade_g 0.250 (0.566) 0.265 (0.570) 0.284 (0.567) 0.245 (0.567) 0.284 (0.567) 0.256 (0.568) 
all_other_sector_g -2.085*** (0.711) -1.997*** (0.703) -2.046*** (0.707) -2.079*** (0.707) -2.022*** (0.703) -2.193*** (0.738) 
y_2009 1.174*** (0.403) 1.167*** (0.400) 1.137*** (0.400) 1.157*** (0.400) 1.134*** (0.399) 1.139*** (0.400) 
y_2010 0.651* (0.383) 0.677* (0.383) 0.661* (0.381) 0.672* (0.381) 0.655* (0.381) 0.673* (0.381) 
y_2011 -0.397 (0.325) -0.404 (0.325) -0.398 (0.322) -0.394 (0.323) -0.400 (0.323) -0.404 (0.323) 
y_2012 -0.828** (0.346) -0.821** (0.346) -0.803** (0.344) -0.780** (0.344) -0.796** (0.344) -0.808** (0.344) 
y_2013 -0.378 (0.320) -0.388 (0.320) -0.386 (0.319) -0.389 (0.319) -0.372 (0.318) -0.380 (0.318) 
Constant -4.302*** (0.724) -4.355*** (0.723) -4.318*** (0.720) -4.294*** (0.723) -4.306*** (0.719) -4.275*** (0.722) 
Observations 622   622   622   622   622   622   
Pseudo R2 0.2198   0.2196   0.2144   0.2156   0.2151   0.2154   
Log likelihood -335.65489   -335.75314   -337.99009   -337.45229   -337.67704   -337.56096   
% Correctly classified 73.31%   73.15%   74.12%   74.12%   74.44%   74.28%   
Ramsey test 0.963   0.6869   0.5633   0.5184   0.3911   0.4478   
White test 0.4356   0.2992   0.5635   0.1081   0.1051   0.1227   
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on STATA output. 
Note: ***, **, * significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
